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Abstract
Alcohol, tobacco, and unhealthy foods contribute greatly to the global burden of non-communicable disease (NCD). 
Member states of the World Health Organization (WHO) have recognized the critical need to address these three key 
risk factors through global action plans and policy recommendations. The 2013-2020 WHO action plan identifies the 
need to engage economic, agricultural and other relevant sectors to establish comprehensive and coherent policy. To date 
one of the biggest barriers to action is not so much identifying affective policies, but rather how a comprehensive policy 
approach to NCD prevention can be established across sectors. Much of the research on policy incoherence across sectors 
has focused on exposing the strategies used by commercial interests to shape public policy in their favor. Although the 
influence of commercial interests on government decisions remains an important issue for policy coherence, we argue, 
that the dominant neoliberal policy paradigm continues to enable the ability of these interests to influence public policy. 
In this paper, we examine how this dominant paradigm and the way it has been enshrined in institutional mechanisms 
has given rise to existing systems of governance of product environments, and how these systems create structural 
barriers to the introduction of meaningful policy action to prevent NCDs by fostering healthy product environments. 
Work to establish policy coherence across sectors, particularly to ensure a healthy product environment, will require 
systematic engagement with the assumptions that continue to structure institutions that perpetuate unhealthy product 
environments.
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Introduction
In 2015, the Zambian government established an incentive 
program to attract investment in a recently developed multi-
facility special economic zone.1,2 This program was offered 
to any company interested in establishing their operations in 
this zone, including tobacco companies. The decision not to 
exclude tobacco companies from this program was in direct 
contravention of the World Health Organization (WHO) 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, which Zambia 
ratified in 2008. Subsequently, two tobacco processing 
and manufacturing plants have been established with the 
expressed aim of targeting the domestic market.3 What led 
to this situation? One explanation is that tobacco interests 
had influenced or even captured the policy process. Tobacco 
interests are notorious for exerting influence on policy. But 
this is only part of the story. Here we argue that ideas, and 
specifically the neoliberal paradigm, has conditioned the 
policy environment in a way that promotes the supply of 
unhealthy commodities. 
There is an important need to expand and deepen 
explanations of the factors that contribute to inconsistencies 
or incoherence in this policy context. Such insights can help 
to inform why there is persistent inattention by economic 
sectors, including trade, commerce, industry and agriculture, 
to the health consequences of their policies.4,5 The most 
common explanation for policy incoherence pertaining to 
product-based non-communicable disease (NCD) risk stems 
from the influence of special interests, particularly unhealthy 
product producing industries, on policy.6,7 Core strategies of 
corporations that have a direct influence on policy include: 
defining a strong narrative regarding ‘well-being’ and personal 
(not government) responsibility, establishing themselves as 
key stakeholders in consultation regarding the rules of trade 
and commerce, and influencing the creation of – and use of – 
knowledge.4,8 Scholarship in this area focuses on uncovering 
the, often nefarious, strategies used by industry to promote 
unhealthy products and prevent their regulation.9-11 
Although the influence of private interests on government 
decisions remains an important issue for policy coherence, 
and scholarship in this area continues to grow under the 
new frame of the commercial determinants of health,12 we 
argue, that policy paradigms are a critical but often invisible 
underpinning of policy (in)coherence, including the ability 
of private interests to influence public policy. In other words, 
the accessibility, affordability, and nature of the products in 
the consumer environment and the ways that companies 
operate within the market and in relation to government is 
conditioned by certain conceptions of the proper relationship 
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between government, market and society. Specifically, we 
illustrate that part of the friction that inhibits healthy product 
policy regimes is the persistence of the neoliberal paradigm 
in shaping the relationship between market, state and 
society. Embedding products in this broader policy context 
complements scholarship on how the commercial sector 
influences product regulation by illustrating how policy 
fosters tobacco, alcohol, and unhealthy foods along the supply 
chain.4,13 
Over the past four decades, neoliberal ideas have suffused 
public policy-making in economic and other sectors. This 
paradigm has been reified in institutions and created conflict 
between (1) government policy that continues to foster 
the production of tobacco, alcohol, and unhealthy foods, 
and (2) government attempts to foster healthy product 
environments. In this paper, we examine how neoliberalism 
became the dominant paradigm, how it has been materialized 
in institutional mechanisms governing product supply, and 
how these ways of governing create structural barriers to 
whole-of-government policy action to prevent NCDs. We 
focus particularly on the ways that this paradigm has shaped 
government approaches to product supply in a global market 
system.
 
The Lasting Impact of the Neoliberal Paradigm
Given that neoliberalism can be an elusive construct, we 
begin with a brief overview of the core tenets of the neoliberal 
paradigm. To begin, neoliberalism is built upon the “central 
values” of “individual liberty and freedom as sacrosanct.”14 
The neoliberal project attempts to translate these basic values 
into a framework articulating the proper relationship between 
government, market and society. Ostensibly neoliberalism 
involves a “restructuring of prevailing ideas, institutions, 
and material capacities that constitute historical structures 
of world order”15 towards the freedom of individuals to drive 
the market. Infused in the theoretical origins of neoliberal 
thought was a societal project aimed at establishing harmony 
and peace by establishing a market system that transcended 
particular loyalties and identities. The societal aspiration of 
the neoliberal project is expressed forcefully by one of its 
champions Milton Friedman16:
“The great virtue of a free market system is that it does not 
care what color people are; it does not care what their religion is; 
it only cares whether they can produce something you want to 
buy. It is the most effective system we have discovered to enable 
people who hate one another to deal with one another and help 
one another.” 
This aspirational undercurrent illustrates that neoliberalism 
was far more than a set of policy prescriptions but rather, 
as Peck and colleagues argue, a “hegemonic restructuring 
ethos.”17 Thus, although the policies and practices of neoliberal 
institutions vary, the underlying paradigm is relatively robust. 
In this paper, we focus on the paradigmatic (rather than 
political) aspect of neoliberalism, as an underlying influence 
on economic policy globally.
Although the underlying rationality of neoliberalism 
is somewhat clear, where freer markets are thought to 
foster greater personal freedom thus leading to greater 
peace and prosperity, the implementation of neoliberal 
principles into institutional form is better characterized 
as a “dominant pattern of (incomplete and contradictory) 
regulatory transformation, and not as a fully coherent 
system or typological state form.”17 However, with the 
structural adjustment programs (SAPs) beginning in the 
1980’s, and the rise of multilateral and bilateral trade and 
investment agreements, there was a systemic shift to the core 
program of trade liberalization, privatization, deregulation, 
property rights among others.18 As Peck notes, this program 
constructs a relationship between government and market 
with a “orientation to export-oriented, financialized capital; 
deep antipathies to social collectivities and sociospatial 
redistribution; and open-ended commitments to market-like 
governance systems, non-bureaucratic modes of regulation, 
privatization, and corporate expansion—but these are always, 
inescapably, forged and revealed in context-specific ways” 
(p. 104).17 The latter point is that the neoliberal program 
was not uniform in its implementation, however, we can see 
that the “theoretical template”14 of neoliberalism has greatly 
influenced public policy around the world. One aspect of this 
neoliberal paradigm that we see translated into economic 
policy is a reluctance to impose socially oriented protections 
in favor of a generic rationality of economic growth. In other 
words, economic growth is given greater policy importance 
than social goals with the idea that growth leads to enhanced 
social welfare. This underlying premise leads to a situation 
where economic policy is often dislocated from social 
policy.19 For example, governments often offer incentives and 
inducements to companies that produce harmful consumer 
products with the narrow aim of stimulating economic 
growth.20,21 As Hall22 noted in his ground-breaking work on 
policy paradigms, “when monetarism replaced Keynesianism 
as the template guiding policy, there was a radical shift in 
the hierarchy of goals guiding policy, the instruments riled 
on to effect policy and the settings of those instruments” (p. 
285). The instruments of government have thus been heavily 
influenced by the structuring ethos of neoliberalism.
A highly relevant implication for the management of product 
environments is the impact this paradigm has had on the 
governance of agricultural commodities. As noted, specific to 
this paradigm is the primacy of a narrow economic rationality 
in approaches to agricultural supply. For example, development 
plans and trade strategies have typically excluded reference to 
the health implications of agricultural commodities, at least 
within the boundaries of licit commodities including food, 
alcohol, and tobacco. The dominant aim has been to foster 
free enterprise and competition in global markets. Because 
these policy approaches are embedded in a global market 
system, the action or inaction of one country has bearing 
on the global supply chain. With specific reference to the 
globalization of the alcohol industry, Jernigan23 notes that 
this process allows large multinational alcohol companies 
the flexibility to shift global production and distribution to 
more amendable policy environments. This same flexibility is 
seen in the operation of tobacco supply whereby companies 
shift distribution in order to take advantage of lower tariffs 
or more efficient distribution channels.24 This global reality 
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places pressure on governments to compete for investment, 
which in domains such as labour policy has led to a ‘race 
to the bottom’ where governments serve to maintain cheap 
labour or weak labour protections as a form of competitive 
advantage to attract investment.25 
One of the clearest examples of a shift in the institutional 
landscape based on a neoliberal paradigm is the privatization 
of state-run companies.18 This shift is largely attributed to the 
implementation of SAPs and free trade regimes. The freeing of 
market structures from state ownership dramatically changed 
the relationship between state and market, where the role of 
the state became one of facilitating the ease of global flows of 
private capital, goods and services. Governments facilitated 
this process not through deregulation but through what 
Otero26 calls neoregulation. In this case we see that the state 
has not relinquished itself from regulating agricultural supply 
but rather has restructured its involvement in accordance with 
the governance (ie, public-private management) of supply 
chains. One example of this shift is the rise in contractual 
arrangements between agro-based companies and smallholder 
farmers in the neoliberal era.27 These arrangements shift the 
management of production from government to private 
entities who provide credit, agricultural inputs such as seed, 
fertilizer, and equipment on loan, and transportation to 
market. Although this is not uniformly true across agricultural 
commodities, this shift is relatively consistent for cash crops 
such as tobacco, oilseeds, and other commodities that have 
health implications for consumers. For example, governments 
in tobacco-producing countries have largely been replaced by 
leaf-buying companies in managing the supply chain, whereby 
these companies provide extension services, inputs (eg, seed, 
fertilizer) on loan, cash loans, transportation to market, and 
other services to tobacco farmers.28-32 
This privatization of agricultural supply chains is seen 
by economic actors as a strategy to increase the quality and 
quantity of agricultural outputs while ensuring markets 
for agricultural commodities. However, it has implications 
for the capacity and willingness of government to engage 
in supply chain management. In particular, governments’ 
have a weakened, or at least a more indirect, ability to 
shape the supply of these commodities. Research into 
tobacco production suggests that farmers continue to 
grow tobacco largely because companies provide access to 
inputs such as seed and fertilizer as well as cash loans and 
access to markets.33-35 Similarly, supply chains for minimally 
processed healthy foods such as fruit and vegetables are often 
characterised by significant losses, due to a systemic lack of 
public investment in agriculture.36 In contrast supply chains 
for highly processed vegetables, such as potato chips are 
highly developed due to downstream industry investment. 
This dynamic is characteristic of the neoliberal paradigm 
representing a general “decline in central government’s 
ability to steer society.”37 The force of law is used to protect 
private individual and corporate rights while ensuring that 
the international movement of goods, services and capital 
is freed, and that this freedom is protected. Another way 
that these impacts are being perpetuated is the embedding 
of companies in regulatory bodies. For example, in Malawi, 
tobacco leaf prices are established by institutions such as the 
Tobacco Control Commission and the Agricultural Research 
Extension Trust, both of which have industry representation 
on their decision-making bodies.38 All of these shifts in the 
relationship between government and market are consistent 
with an economic paradigm that views the role of government 
as facilitator of freer market activity. 
The Institutionalization of Neoliberalism
Neoliberal ideology finds its force in the establishment of 
institutions that orient policy towards the principles outlined 
above. Ostrom characterizes institutions as the rules, norms 
and strategies that shape action taken by government.39,40 
In a nuanced analysis of the ‘old’ and ‘new’ instruments 
of government, Jordan and colleagues37 suggest that ‘old’ 
forms of government characterized by ‘strong’ government 
action, whereby government sets the agenda and establishes 
mechanisms of command-and-control, still exist but have 
given way to ‘new’ instruments. These new instruments are 
characterized by varied levels of involvement with and control 
by non-governmental entities. This shift in the instruments 
used by government is exemplified by the pervasive use 
voluntary codes and standards in meeting health-based 
targets in the reduction of sodium and other unhealthy 
ingredients in foods.41,42 
There are different mechanisms of reification that have 
structured governments’ relationship to agricultural 
production, commodity processing and manufacturing and 
the management of consumer demand. The embedding 
and reification of neoliberal ideas is in part the result of 
diffusion through powerful global institutions, as evidenced 
by the dominance and global impact of the SAPs driven by 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank15,43 
and the international trade and investment regimes that 
have the ability to discipline governments for policies that 
did not support the opening of markets to competition.44,45 
The domestication of this paradigm can be found in national 
development plans, export development strategies, and the 
ministerial mandates of economic sectors of government. 
Although we have emphasized the structuring of the 
neoliberal paradigm in the policy and institutional landscape, 
alone this perspective is overly deterministic. To temper 
this structural dimension, it is important to turn to ideas, 
discourses and their relationship to policy change.46,47 The 
‘new institutionalism’ provides important insights into how 
institutions shape the preferences and behavior of decision-
makers while articulating the dynamic capacity of agents 
to shape institutions. Two of the central assertions of new 
institutionalism is that “preferences or interests expressed in 
action should not be conflated with ‘true preferences” and 
that “institutional configurations may privilege particular 
sets of interests.”46 In other words, the perpetuation of policy 
paradigms is at least in part driven by institutional legacies. 
These legacies are reflected in ‘real’ institutions. These 
institutions are at one level structuring, whereby government 
decision-makers enter into pre-existing institutions with 
particular historical legacies, mandates, bureaucratic 
arrangements, etc. At the same time government decision-
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makers, civil society and non- and inter-governmental actors 
have power to shape these institutions to modify mandates, 
reconfigure bureaucratic arrangements and create new 
rules. The insight that institutions do not always reflect the 
preferences of individuals operating within them recognizes 
that although institutions shape action, contestation exists 
within institutions. From a practical perspective, this insight 
has implications for how one approaches efforts to establish 
policy coherence. It is common to conflate problematic policies 
with the preferences of policy-makers. However, institutional 
structures can preference certain actor perspectives, such that 
policy-makers are differentially exposed to input in policy-
making, which aligns with the dominant paradigm. Industry 
actors are seen as major legitimate stakeholders by economic 
policy actors because within a neoliberal paradigm the private 
sector is critical to their mandate to support economic growth 
and employment. For example, alcohol policy in Lesotho, 
Malawi, Uganda, and Botswana was heavily influenced by 
industry actors. What this meant for public health is that the 
policies selectively adopted international recommendations 
and minimized a public health approach to alcohol problems, 
while emphasising the economic benefits from trade in 
alcohol.48 
What we are arguing is that the neoliberal paradigm is a 
critical driver of the tension that arises when the health sector 
attempts to intervene in the supply of unhealthy products 
governed by economic sectors. For example, economic 
norms aligned with the neoliberal paradigm have suffused 
the discourse and institutions in tobacco growing countries 
creating recurrent patterns of argumentation against tobacco 
control that transcend local contexts.49,50 In countries like 
Zambia, Malawi and Kenya, the development plans have 
given preference to mandates of economic ministries, and 
include efforts to defend tobacco production even though 
evidence contradicts its economic viability.31,32 Similarly, 
in South Africa, the dominant economic policy paradigm 
addresses food as a commodity – pivotal for employment and 
rural development – with minimal consideration of nutrition 
implications of the food environment.51 
However, as Schmitt argues, institutions are dynamic sites 
of contestation (not static objects), in which individuals have 
the capacity to participate in discursive processes that shape 
both the ideational basis of the rules, norms and strategies 
that constitute the institutional environment.52,53 There 
are examples of recent shifts in national policy regarding 
unhealthy agricultural commodities such as tobacco, driven 
in part by concerted efforts of international institutions 
such as the United Nations Development Programme to 
integrate health with economic development.54 For example, 
Malawi’s most recent national export and development 
strategies emphasize the need to move away from tobacco 
production into other agriculture commodities such as oil 
seeds. Although these policies use economic framing, there 
is evidence that the health discourse is beginning to shape 
discourses in the economic sector or at least the economic 
discourses are no longer isolated from the messages of health 
advocates confronting a narrow economic rationality.55-58 
This contestation is exemplified at the intersection of trade 
and tobacco control whereby tobacco control proponents, 
drawing from government commitments to the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control, have worked to infuse 
health goals in the logic of economic sectors.49,57,59
Implications for Policy Action
Our aim in articulating the paradigmatic tensions that exist 
within government, the institutions that are born from these 
different paradigms, and the ways that these institutions 
approach the management of product environments is to, in 
part, sensitize health advocates to the issues facing colleagues 
in the economic sector. We conclude by discussing how this 
understanding can shape approaches to policy coherence for 
healthy product environments. 
First, the influence of health-harming industries on public 
policy is real and deeply problematic for public health. As 
illustrated above, the relationship between policy-makers and 
industry is often far too close and conflicts of interest, in many 
cases outright corruption, abound. It is clear that institutions 
must be reoriented to protect public policy from private 
interests through enforceable rules of engagement if health 
protection is going to be a whole-of-government initiative. 
One prominent example of such an initiative is the Guidelines 
for the Implementation of Article 5.3 of the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control, which establishes principles 
and recommendations to guide interactions between 
government and the tobacco industry.60 The ultimate aim is to 
educate all sectors of government about the harmful impacts 
of tobacco industry practices, reduce or eliminate industry 
involvement in policy processes and where this is not possible, 
ensure transparency when involvement occurs. Although 
the implementation of Article 5.3 has faced challenges, it is 
one example of how norms can infuse institutions to ensure 
government officials distance themselves from industries that 
produce health-harming goods.61 
Second, there are practical implications of attending to 
the conditions that foster policy incoherence. The context of 
cooperation between sectors is often strained. This strained 
relationship is often fueled by mistrust and competing 
viewpoints on an issue.62 Although it is commonly understood 
that different viewpoints or frames can create tension and 
distance between sectors, few studies have articulated the 
paradigmatic assumptions that structure such viewpoints. 
The perspective we are advocating for in this article 
compliments work that interrogates these paradigmatic 
assumptions underlying tensions between trade and health62,63 
by identifying how the neoliberal paradigm has structured the 
institutional environment in economic, agricultural and other 
sectors that shapes the supply of unhealthy products. The 
perspective we are advancing here is that by understanding 
this paradigmatic and institutional context health advocates 
can be more sympathetic to policy-makers in these sectors. 
Contrary to the assumption that policy-makers in these 
sectors are willfully aligned with commercial interests, this 
perspective illustrates that government officials are often 
bound up within historically structured patterns of thinking 
and doing that foreground economic interests over health 
considerations. For example, analysis of the intersectoral 
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governing body on tobacco established in the Philippines 
revealed that the representatives from the economic sector 
of government viewed the tobacco industry as a legitimate 
stakeholder based on the perspective that they were a legal 
enterprise contributing to the economic goals of the country. 
These officials sought to ‘balance’ economic and social goals 
in the operations of this intersectoral body.64 Not surprisingly, 
this perspective created animosity between economic and 
health sector representatives. Interestingly, Lang65 argues that 
the dominance of the neoliberal paradigm has even shaped 
the notion of ‘balance’ between economic and social goals in 
a way that perpetuates the implicit dominance of a narrow 
economic rationality over a socially oriented economic 
policy. All this to illustrate that neoliberal ideas are often not 
explicated or interrogated when it comes to efforts to establish 
policy coherence. 
Third, and stemming from the point above, we hope that 
this perspective widens the scope for creative solutions to 
the problem of policy incoherence. For example, rather than 
simply focusing on the regulation of unhealthy products, there 
can be a shift towards achieving healthy product environments 
by engaging with sectors such as agribusiness who are charged 
with ensuring economic growth and facilitating the economic 
livelihoods of farmers.66,67 Addressing supply side issues 
serves to break down silos that indirectly or directly provide 
industries that produce unhealthy products an opportunity to 
engage with policy-makers. In other words, the supply side 
issues are often neglected by health advocates and because 
of this neglect, the supply side is driven by relationships 
between industry and government supported by conditions 
that encourage such relationships in the spirit of economic 
development. By engaging with decision-makers involved in 
supply side issues health advocates have an opportunity to 
create dialogue across paradigms and interrogate and debate 
the merits of these paradigmatic foundations with those who 
are operating to foster product supply. 
Conclusion 
The work articulating how interests have shaped public 
policy, often in contradiction to the goals of health ministries, 
has provided important insights into barriers to policy 
coherence. Analysing the commercial determinants of health 
provides insights into why public policy often makes the 
healthy choice the difficult one for consumers. The question 
that has received less attention is what underlying conditions 
have shaped a policy environment that is conducive to the 
influence of commercial interests. Contrary to public health 
concerns regarding the influence of private commercial 
interests in the institutional environment where policy 
decisions are made and enacted, economic sector actors often 
see this involvement as part of the mandate of stakeholder 
engagement. This disconnect across sectors cannot simply 
be explained by corporate lobbying or nefarious relationships 
between private and public entities. What we have attempted 
to illustrate is that these relationships are a logical extension of 
the neoliberal paradigm that has for four decades dominated 
the imagination of the policy sphere serving to structure the 
institutional landscape in countries around the world. Work 
to establish policy coherence across sectors, particularly to 
ensure a healthy product environment will require systematic 
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